August 2023 Archives

Several people on the political left in the wake of Jacksonville (or any other shooting): Can't we please agree something needs to be done about firearms?

Neither I nor any other gun rights activist I'm aware of has a problem with keeping guns out of the hands of violent felons and the mentally ill.

However, in all the times I've had this discussion, never ONCE has the anti-gun lobby or anyone affiliated with it been willing to discuss measures to do that. No matter how many times we have explained to them it's a bad idea that won't work, is unconstitutional, and that cold hard experience and real scientific studies we can cite at length says in no uncertain terms it will not work, they want to ban guns. Or at least certain types of guns, which they can't seem to define in such a way as to limit the types of guns they want to ban. Especially not in any way that makes sense to someone who understands what guns are and how they work.

I'm going to go so far as to say this approach is arguing in bad faith. They have no intention of absorbing the information the other side is providing, especially where it might disturb their ignorance.

In short, they don't want to learn what might lower the casualty count. They want to ban guns, and any representation otherwise is a lie, and to the extent any of them believe it, self-deception.

ALL efforts to keep guns out of the hands of felons in my lifetime have failed, in large part because the very people who claim they want guns kept out of the hands of criminals won't enforce the few regulations that have been passed. People caught dead to rights with violations that should send them back to prison for crimes they've already convicted of and they're on parole for walk out of custody no worse off for having been caught. Others caught with fifty counts of more of weapons possession or illegal sale - their rights to carry having been previously forfeited by due process of law - walk with no more than a misdemeanor for which they receive no jail time. All sanctioned by the same politicians who claim they want guns kept out of the hands of violent criminals. If you think this is the way you lower the body count, you are clinically insane. Guns are too easy to make; even true automatic weapons. If you want to have any effect at all on criminals obtaining them, there have to be real and significant consequences to those criminals. No consequences beyond confiscation? They'll simply acquire more.

Praxeologically, the actions of the anti-gun lobby are clearly demonstrating these people do NOT want to keep guns out of the hands of criminals.

NONE of the methods the anti-gunners are proposing would restrict the supply of illegal guns, by the way. Few would even restrict the ability of those not allowed to possess guns from obtaining them from more or less legal channels. All they seem to be concerned about is restricting the supply of guns to law-abiding, mentally competent citizens through legal channels.

If that's what the anti-gun lobby wants, get busy trying to repeal the Second Amendment. If that's too hard for you, tough. There's a reason why the Constitution is supposed to be difficult to amend. Tell me, would you like your rights to speak, to organize, to privacy, to presumed innocence to be easily legislated away?

So what's it going to be, anti-gunners? Are you going to start enforcing the laws against possession for those who've had the right to bear arms legally removed? If so, pretty much every gun rights activist I've ever met or corresponded with would be fine with it; most would help you pass good legislation aimed at precisely what you claim you want and what would really make a difference.

But if - as your actions illustrate - what you really want is to disarm law-abiding citizens, then NO we're not going to go along meekly with your idiocy, no matter how many slaughters of the innocent you enable. Get used to it. We're well aware of your dissembling and bad faith arguments these past several decades. You're not going to move us, and we will use every legal means at our disposal to fight you from now until the end of the world.

So stop being dishonest, and stop arguing in bad faith. If you really want to solve the problem, honestly define what you want. If it's banning all weapons, my answer (and that of every other student of history) is going to be 'no.' But at least your self-deception will be gone, and we'll be talking about the real issue.

On the other hand, if you want to lower the casualty count from people who really shouldn't have weapons, the gun rights side has got some good, historically tested solutions we'd like you to listen to and maybe try.

I've seen a fair number of questions on impound accounts in the last several months. An impound account, also known by the confusing term escrow account because the lender is holding it in escrow, is money that you give the lender in order to pay the property taxes and homeowner's insurance on the property when they are due.

The first thing to note and emphasize is that money going into an impound account is not a cost of doing the loan. It is your money. You own it. It will be used solely to pay your property taxes and your insurance. At the conclusion of the loan, whether you paid it off with cash or refinanced or or sold the property, you get any money left in the account back. The lender is required to send you the check within sixty days of loan payoff.

An impound account is meant to address any lender's two largest worries in regards to a loan: Uninsured destruction of the property or losing the property to an unpaid property tax lien.

The problem with an uninsured destruction should be obvious. The structure is destroyed or heavily damaged and no money exists to rebuild. The borrower doesn't have it and the bank isn't going to throw good money after bad. Here in California, the average property is worth maybe $500,000 or so, but without the home sitting on it, the property may only be worth fifty to a hundred thousand. Within ten miles of my office sit hundreds, probably thousands, of new homes that sold for $700,00 and up even though they sit on a lot that's less than 5000 square feet (0.115 Acres). Many condominiums are over $400,000. Given the location, a 5000 square foot lot may be $200,000, but it's not $500,000, and the lender will take a loss even on the $200,000 because they're not in the business of real estate. They loan $500,000, it burns down without insurance, they lose $350,000. People also lose their jobs over this.

Property tax liens are a major issue as well. They automatically take priority over everything else, and the rules about what the condemning governmental entity has to do are much looser than they are for the bank. They will usually do quite a bit over the minimum, but they will sell the property most of the time, no matter how minimal the best bid. Minimum auction amounts and many other things mandated for when lenders sell the property go out the window when it's the government. Many times this situation can require the lender to step in and pay the property taxes, intending to turn around and sell the property themselves merely to take a smaller loss.

A lender wants you to pay property taxes and homeowner's insurance, and they want to know you've paid them. They encourage this via the method of impound accounts. The theory is simple. Every month you pay the lender, in addition to your actual loan payment, an amount equal to your pro-rated property taxes and homeowner's insurance, and they will take this money and pay those bills when they are due.

No lender is perfect about these, and some are less so than others. A large percentage of the biggest and worst messes I have ever dealt with came about as the result of the lender somehow messing up the inpound account. Others have arisen because even though the lender acted within the law, the client got angry about something. Sometimes it's for a good reason, sometimes it's not.

Because lenders want you to have them, however, they are ubiquitous, and every lender I know of charges extra on your loan if you do not want to do an impound account, unless you live in a state which prohibits the practice. Usually this amount is about one quarter of a discount point. On a $500,000 loan, this amounts to a charge of over $1250 just to not have any impounds.

On the other hand, in places where property values are high, you can have to come up with $5000 or more at loan time just to adequately fund an impound account. Here's a computation of how much you need to fund it works. The lender will divide the annual property taxes and homeowner's insurance by twelve. This will be the monthly payment. The lender is legally able to hold up to two months over the amount required to make the payments, and they want this reserve. So they will look at the projected payments for the next year and figure out how many months they need up front to always have two months worth in reserve. I'm writing this on February 3, and California taxes were due on the first even though they are not past due until April 10th. But the lender uses February first to calculate even though they won't actually make the payment until early April (they earn interest on the money, whether or not they pay any. Some states require that interest be paid, but it is typically something small and worthless like two percent).

February first is usually when the lenders here in California figure will be the low point of the account for the whole year. But if you closed on a loan in February, you wouldn't make your first payment on that loan until April first, and of course, they cannot count on you making your next February payment right on the first. So they are going to figure that you will make payments on the first of every month April through January, ten months, before they have to pay your property taxes. Since they have to pay twelve months, and they get to keep two in reserve, that's fourteen months of payments they want to have on February first. Fourteen minus ten is four months that you will have to come up with in advance, or have rolled into the cost of your loan. On a $500k property, that's about $2000 for property taxes even in a basic tax zone, and if your insurance is $1200 per year, you'll have to come up with another $400 for that. $2400 into the impound account.

It gets better. Because the property taxes are due within two months of your purchase, you're going to have to come up with your pro-rated share right up front as well as paying for an entire year of insurance. Since California requires six months property taxes at a time, that adds almost another five months taxes and twelve months insurance up front. Total cost of this in the example given: $3700. Actually, this is due whether you have an impound account or not. Total you need just for property taxes and homeowner's insurance: $5900.

It can be worse. Suppose you were closing on a refinance in October. You originally bought in February. You are only going to make two payments (December and January) before the insurance is due, so your impound total for the insurance alone $1000 for insurance. You are going to have to come up with $3000 to pay the first half of your property taxes, plus because you only have two payments before the second half is due, another $3000, or six months payments for that. Total due, $7000.

There are really only two methods for coming up with the money for an impound account: Bring in the cash from somewhere else, or have the lender loan it to you, adding it to your loan balance. Except in rare circumstances where you are refinancing the same property with the same lender (and usually not even then), existing impound accounts cannot be used to "seed" the new account. This is because it's your money, held in trust. The rules for these accounts are rigid, and I'm not certain I understand well the rules about whether a bank even has the option of rolling one impound account into another.

This typically means that you have to come up with a good chunk of change out of your pocket for a short period, or add the additional amount into your loan, where you'll be paying for it as long as you have a loan on the property. Every situation is different, but most often I prefer to either come up with the money myself or not have an impound account. The extra charges may be sunk as opposed to refundable, but I'm not paying interest for thirty years on thousands of dollars.

Furthermore, if you are adding the money to create the new impound account to your loan balance, since it's going in before the computation of points, it can add another $50 to $100 to your costs of the loan per point you're paying. Minor in and of itself, but adding insult to injury if the loan has points involved. More to the point is that adding impound creation it to your loan balance means there may be a couple years before your balance gets as low as it was before the refinance, just from this. Indeed, the fact that it raises your loan balance is the worst thing about the impound account issue. On the other hand, unless you have a "first dollar" prepayment penalty, what you can do is turn around and put the check for the previous impound account when it arrives into paying down the new loan. It typically won't bring you even, and it won't reduce your contractual payments on the new loan (although that is usually a good thing), but it will ameliorate the damage to your loan balance.

Initial loan closing is not your only opportunity to start an impound account if you want one. If you don't have one to start with, the lenders will be very happy to let you start one later. I've literally never heard of a lender saying anything but "YES!" (usually with a pump of the fist) to a request for an impound account. Why? Because now they know that your taxes and insurance will be paid, and get to use your money, and after you paid a fee for no impounds. Oh, happy banker!

If you want to cancel an impound account, especially within a year of whenever the loan was funded, you can expect to pay the "no impounds" fee, possibly prorated, but usually just the whole thing. Roll thousands of dollars into your loan balance where you'll be paying interest on it and then pay a lender's charge for no impounds? Ouch!

Can you force the bank not to do any of this? Not really. They don't have to lend you money. Yes, they are in the business of lending money, but if they don't loan it to you, they'll find other uses for it. Somebody else is always willing to accept the bank's terms. You try to violate guidelines that lenders have established in order to lend you the money, and you'll be told, "Sorry but you don't qualify." The golden rule of loans is that those with the money make the rules.

Furthermore, those lenders who didn't require this would be at a competitive disadvantage as regards rates, because their loan portfolio would be a significantly riskier one, and they would have to increase their rates to compensate for this. You could qualify for a better rate or lower closing costs somewhere else. Better to not argue. Assuming that I already have an impound account, all the extra I lose is a maximum of sixty days interest. Two months interest on $5000, even at ten percent, is $83. That's a lot cheaper than any of the alternatives.

Caveat Emptor

Original article here

If you read the papers and the congressional record on the housing crisis, you might think yield spread is the central culprit for the entire meltdown. You would be wrong.

Yield spread is a beneficial tool, offered voluntarily by lenders, that is an alternative to consumers paying all of the costs of a mortgage themselves.

No matter who does your loan, broker or direct lender, they need to get paid for doing it. If they cannot make money at it, they won't be in the business of doing loans. There are high cost loans and low cost loans, and any number of ways of paying those costs, but there is no such thing as a free loan, and anybody who pretends otherwise is either a naive child or lying through their teeth. There are a very few loan providers out here who will finish loans on which they don't make anything in order to keep their promise about the terms of that loan to clients, but there has never been a loan in the history of the world where the provider planned not to make anything.

Yield spread arises as a by-product of the price that the lender receives on the secondary market. On the day I originally wrote this, for thirty year fixed rate conforming loans, at 5.5%, lenders were making about 20 cents per hundred dollars over the actual dollar value, in addition to the roughly $1.30 per hundred dollars the lowest priced lender I had was charging brokers. For a $300,000 loan, this means they were making roughly $4500 for a loan where the broker did all the work from attracting the customer onwards through the rest of the loan (the rate cost more than three points in the one direct lender retail branch I saw last week, so they'd be making about $9600 there). None of this covers all the fees for service, aka closing costs, or loan price adjustors. This is purely from the act of putting the money to the deal. At 6.00%, the lenders were making about $1.56 per $100 of loan amount directly, and that's about where wholesale par was, the loans that brokers could do without any explicit charge for the money. The retail direct branch of the lender wanted a point and a half to do that loan. Finally, at 6.5, they were making about $2.31 per hundred dollars directly from the secondary market, and they were agreeing to give brokers about seventy-five cents of that in the form of Yield Spread.

What this boils down to is that wholesale lender is looking to make about 1.5% of the loan amount, no matter what loan the consumer is put into, merely for the act of funding the loan. It is out of the difference between the number the wholesale lenders charge, and what their retail lending branches charge, that brokers make their living. If brokers can get the loan done for less than the retail branch, and still make money, the consumer comes out ahead.

There is no requirement for lenders to offer Yield Spread. They don't do so to enable brokers to hose customers that they would rather have walking into their own retail branches. They do it to compete for the business of people who have discovered that using brokers is actually a way to get the same loan cheaper. They do so because other lenders do so. Because they really want that $1.50 per hundred dollars loaned, they'll willingly give up most of any amount over that to encourage brokers to come to them, rather than the other lender. As I've said, in loans there is no difference in brand names. It's just money. So long as the terms are the same, it really doesn't matter if you're making the check for payments out to "International Megabank, Inc" or "Fifty-Third Bank of Podunk," and that really is the only difference. In fact, using brokers as a way to expand their reach is one of the ways small lenders can become major players quickly, without the expense of opening branches. More than one major household name has done precisely that. By the way, this $1.50 per hundred dollars loaned is very low by historical standards - it was roughly $2.50 twelve months before, and twelve months before that it was more like $4.00. But there was a lot of money chasing not very many borrowers just then, and it hasn't changed much since. Nor is any of this in any way evil. As a matter of fact, it has enabled much lower interest rates for consumers than the traditional lending model where the lenders held the loans for the duration.

Nor do lenders like paying yield spread. They'd rather have the entire secondary market premium for themselves. They offer it for one reason and one reason only: Because the brokers would otherwise take their clients to a different lender who did offer it. Most brokers operate on a set margin per loan, especially the better ones. The good ones are willing to disclose this margin, the bad ones will do everything they can to hide it. This margin may vary between loans. If borrower A is a slam-dunk A paper borrower, that loan can be done a lot more easily than a sub-prime borrower who needs to qualify based upon bank statements, and will eat up a lot less of my time and therefore, the loan should be done on a thinner margin. Whatever this margin is, it can be paid via origination (a charge for doing the application and getting the loan done), it can be paid via flat dollar charge to the borrower, it can be paid via yield spread, or it can be paid via a combination of these. But it is going to get paid. When I quote a loan, I quote it in terms of terms and total cost to the consumer, including what I make, and if I'm not going to make enough to make it worth my while to leave home, I'd rather not do the loan. Others quote higher, building a bit in that they're prepared to negotiate away if the client asks. Still others just make believe that they're going to deliver the loan on better terms than they will actually deliver it to get you to sign up with them - but the chances of anyone actually pricing the loan so as not to make anything are zero. Consumers looking to tell the difference between better and worse providers should ask Questions you should ask loan providers. That is another change for the worse in the new lender environment, but the way. When I originally wrote this, I could lock every loan upon application and guarantee the price immediately. As I explained a few months ago, that is no longer the case. The lenders have begun charging me (and therefore my future clients) too much for loans that are locked but not delivered. It's hard to blame them, but it's still not a beneficial change for consumers.

Yield spread is nota cost paid by consumers, Dodd-Frank notwithstanding. It doesn't show up anywhere in the list of charges they pay. Were its disclosure not mandated by federal law, the consumer would have absolutely no evidence of its existence except the absence of other charges or the fact that they have been paid without the consumer having to shell out a dime. I agree with the disclosure law, by the way. Indeed, I want to expand it to require lenders to disclose the secondary market premium they would be paid assuming they sold the loan. Consumers do pay for yield spread indirectly, of course, with increased interest charges during the life of the loan. But they pay those same charges whether incurred as a result of a broker earning yield spread or a lender being able to make the money on the secondary market. Furthermore, paying those charges will be to the consumer's benefit if the increased charges for interest offset or more than offset the higher fees they would have to pay in order to get a lower rate. There is always a tradeoff between rate and cost in every loan. Most consumers do not keep their loans long enough to justify the higher fees for a lower interest loan. Similarly, if the loan is going to go to from a fixed or set rate to a variable rate loan before the higher costs for a lower rate have been recouped, whatever wasn't recovered before that happens has been wasted, as all the loans of a given type reset to the same rate when they adjust - doesn't matter whether you got a zero cost loan out of Yield Spread, or you paid five points to buy the rate down, and therefore the payment. But the 4.875% 3/1 that closes today will in three years reset to the exact same rate and payment as they 6.25% 3/1. Well, not exactly. Because assuming they did what most borrowers do and roll those costs into the loan, that 4.875% loan will have a higher balance owed than the one that was initially 6.25%, and therefore will have a higher payment when they both reset. So yield spread has done the latter borrower a favor by helping them control overall loan costs.

Let's look at what happens if we count yield spread as part of the costs of the loan. First off, it makes it appear as if loans including yield spread are more expensive than ones without. This gives direct lenders an apparent (not real!) advantage over brokers. Let's consider an actual real world example: A few days before I originally wrote this, a retail lending branch offered one of my prospects a 6.125% loan for one point, while he came back to me and I locked him into for 6.125% for ZERO points, a price which included me making about nine tenths of a point in yield spread. Assuming closing costs are the same (in fact, mine are lower than theirs), here's what the client sees now on a loan with a $300,000 loan payoff. (I'm also going to assume anything other than actual costs, such as prepaid interest, are paid out of pocket)

This reflects reality. The client ends up with a loan balance $3060 lower, and a payment $18.59 lower, through getting exactly the same thirty year fixed rate loan through me as he would have gotten through that lender.

But if I have to count yield spread as a part of the cost of the loan to the consumer despite the fact that he's not paying it, here's what the sheet looks like:

First, note that the actual amounts owed by the consumer after closing the broker originated loan are exactly the same whether yield spread is counted as a cost or not. It makes zero difference to what the consumer actually pays. The loan amount is the same, the interest rate is the same, the payment is the same.

Why does the government want to make it look like the broker loan is more expensive than it really is? In the second example, appears at first glance like the consumer is paying almost as much for the broker loan as for the lender loan. They're not. Keep in mind that this is for exactly the same thirty year fixed rate loan at 6.125% - except that the consumer's loan balance if they go through the broker ends up $3000 lower. That $2726.10 in yield spread is not a cost to the consumer. Indeed, Yield Spread is only a cost to the lender. Note that the consumer's balance and payments in no way reflect yield spread, and my client has been told about it, but really doesn't care. Being a rational consumer, he shopped for the loan on the best terms to him and his family. He doesn't care if I'm making ten cents or ten million dollars. All he cares about is I get him the exact same thing for a cost that is thousands of dollars less. But if Yield Spread is listed as part of the cost on the Good Faith Estimate (or MLDS in California), then it appears as if that lender's loan is a lot more competitive than it really is, i.e. $5950 to $5626, not the reality of $5960 to $2900. Furthermore, this was an uncommonly broad difference, that still looks like the broker is offering a better loan. Far more common is a differential spread of half a point or so. If the price differential were only half a point, the broker's loan would look more expensive, while being in fact less expensive to the consumer who doesn't know yield spread is an accounting phantom as far as they are concerned. The consumer would still be saving money with the broker - about $1500, a full 25% of the actual costs of the loan, but listing yield spread as a cost makes it appear as if the lender's loan is cheaper when it is in fact more expensive.

Furthermore, listing yield spread as a cost has some other effects. Suppose you live in an area where the cost of housing is about $60,000 to $80,000 or less. Under the same bill in congress proposing to count yield spread as a cost to consumers even though it is not, is a provision limiting total costs of loans to six percent. Six percent of $60,000 is $3600. Six percent of $80,000 is $4800. There literally is not a loan that a broker can do under these limits. I can't keep the doors open on $700 per loan, which is all that's left after those $2900 of fixed closing costs at the low end. It's not like I get to spend every dollar the company makes on my family. Even at the higher end, it's probably not worth my while to accept a loan on which I can only make $1900. Effect: Brokers in those areas go out of business, but direct lenders are still in business, lessening competition. They can jack up the rates until the secondary market will pay them enough, and secondary market premiums aren't officially considered part of costs, even in the artificial environment of this new bill. Result: Rates rise, lending margins rise, competition is less. Big Winner: direct lenders, who clean up with all the extra money they make. Big Loser: brokers, who go out of business. Of course, consumers lose, too, as do real estate agents because prices are lower as a direct result of higher rates, but hey, that's okay because the big bankers who bundle million dollar campaign contributions made out!

Let me make something explicitly clear: Low cost real estate loans cannot be done without yield spread. The loan provider has to make enough to stay open. The closing costs are real, and the people performing those functions need to get paid or they won't do them. If they don't do them, the lenders will not approve your loan. There are three ways to pay these costs: yield spread, out of the consumer's checking account, or (on refinances with existing equity) by adding those costs to the loan balance, where they are still paid plus the lender gets interest on them!

Suppose you live in an area, such as I do, where the cost of housing and loans is enough higher for this not to be a danger. One cold hard fact is that there are still people who bought years ago that bankers have a free field with because brokers cannot legally do their loans and still make enough money to keep the doors open. Consider a $200,000 loan, where 6% is $12,000, so the maximum loan cost just isn't a factor. Such a person, realizing that they've owned this property ten years and refinanced five times, decides they want a zero cost loan, because they'll come out better. Well, a broker can still get them a loan that doesn't really cost them anything, but brokers no longer are legally capable of calling it a zero cost loan, because legally, yield spread is legally required to be counted as a cost. All we can do is call it by some name that sounds like a legalistic way to lie. So now lenders can advertise "zero cost loans," and brokers are breaking the law if they try, despite the fact that they offer the same loan at zero real cost to the consumer with a rate a quarter of a percent less than the lender will. Indeed, for all the low cost options, the lenders now appear to be cheaper than brokers even though they are not. Also found in this same legislation is a provision to make it illegal for brokers to get part of their compensation via yield spread and part via origination. This is the vast majority of my current loan business, because it's the range where the Tradeoff between rate and cost is best for consumers. Say I figure I need eight tenths of a point to make a loan worthwhile for me to do. If the yield spread for the rate the customer chooses is three tenths of a point, I need a half point of origination to make it work. But now I can't do this loan the simple way. I have to charge eight tenths origination, and even though I agree to rebate the three tenths of a point of yield spread to the consumer - in other words, even though it's an accounting phantom never really coming out of the borrower's pocket in the first place, it still legally counts as a cost of the loan. So the new accounting with the requirement of adding double counting the yield spread to the official cost of the loan makes it look like the broker's loan costs 1.1 points, even though the consumer is only paying five tenths net, getting three tenths of a point in their pocket. If the trade off was seven tenths of yield spread to one of origination, it looks like a 1.5 point loan by this new accounting, even though the consumer is only paying one tenth of a point. Result: Consumers are going to have to have an accounting degree to realize that the broker's loan, which looks more expensive, is in fact the cheaper loan.

This is the exact opposite of what the government should be looking to do. But the mortgage banking industry has much bigger pockets than the mortgage broker industry, and they realized quite early on in this whole meltdown that if they painted brokers and yield spread as bad and controlled the narrative and their bought friends in congress controlled congressional testimony, they could make this entire housing meltdown for which they were more responsible than any other group into a public relations opportunity to restore the dominance of residential lending they had forty years ago. Bankers don't like paying yield spread, and they don't like competing with brokers, whose costs are lower because nobody expects brokers to have flawlessly landscaped offices with three inch think carpet, security guards, and armored bank vaults, or to wear $2000 suits. They do so only through what they saw as a tragedy of the commons type mechanism, where they could compete for broker's business at the costs of lessening their own margins, or not get any. Of course, this tragedy for lenders was a boon for consumers, but their responsibilities are to their own bottom line, and if they can legally shackle brokers, not to mention legally keeping their competition among other lenders from competing for broker business, those lenders are all better off.

Who's not better off? Well, basically everyone except major banks. Lessened competition, loan documents that make it appear as if one provider's loans are more expensive than actual while not making equivalent disclosures about other provider's loans, all of this translates into higher loan prices for consumers. It may seem penny ante to object to consumers paying a few hundred dollars extra here, a few thousand dollars extra there, but when you put it together across 100 million units or more, this translates into hundreds of billions of dollars per year, all sliced into fewer pie portions because the lending industry just effectively got a lot smaller, and with brokers diminished the costs of entry just got a lot steeper for any new lenders who want a piece of the action.

Yield spread is a tool, and a highly beneficial one from consumer's point of view. It has been one of the largest contributing factors in the rise of brokers, and through brokers, of making mortgages more affordable to consumers. It is not a cost to the consumer, and should not be treated as such, although it should be disclosed, as it is required to be. It can be misused, as it was in the case of negative amortization loans, but the ultimate indictment there goes back to the lenders who offered the loans and the high yield spreads, with regulators and mortgage brokers solely in supporting roles. Indeed the best way to fix this entire problem for the future would be to fix the disclosure rules to make the process clear to the consumer, as I wrote in How to Avoid A Repeat of the Housing Market Mess - but if Congress starts to fix those, nobody would be able to hose the consumers, and (sarcasm on) we can't have that, can we?

Caveat Emptor

Original article here

Many people are unaware how profoundly lending policies influence the market for residential property and the various kinds of housing and methods of construction. So I am going to go over the various gradations in available loans for various types of property.

Pretty much everyone is familiar with the standard house, built on site, mostly by hand, from basic materials. Called "stick built" to differentiate it from other building methods, this is the default housing that everyone is familiar with. Once emplaced upon that property, there is no real way of getting it off the property intact, and therefore it is appurtenant to the land. This might come as a shock to people who concentrate on the house, but when you buy a property, you are buying the land upon which it sits - the lot - and the structure comes along because it is appurtenant - attached and cannot be moved off easily. It is this type of property which has been at the forefront of liberalization of lenders loan policies, precisely because it is both universally desirable and non-portable. That land is defined by its boundaries. It isn't going anywhere. The structure isn't going anywhere that the land isn't, because in order to remove it, you pretty much have to destroy it. It's built on a several ton concrete foundation, which, if you nonetheless manage to pick it up, is still overwhelmingly likely to crack if not disintegrate, not to mention ripping out plumbing, electrical, and other connections.

Because the land isn't movable and the structure isn't either, lenders have gotten comfortable that you're not going anywhere with that structure. Because the combination is so universally desired among consumers of housing, they have gotten comfortable with giving loans for almost the full purchase cost of the property, knowing that it takes a special set of circumstances for them to take a loss on the property, and they can charge higher interest rates in order to insure against that. (I am using insure in the statistical, law of large numbers sense that is the essence of insurance.)

Once upon a time, lenders treated condominiums far less favorably than single family detached housing. But it was always obvious that condominium units weren't going anywhere, and in recent years condominiums, in all their incarnations, have reached a level of acceptance among housing consumers that assures their marketability, and even the price discrimination against high-rise condominiums is gradually dying out. It is far less than it was just a few years ago. For condominiums four stories and less, the only difference their status made until recently had to do with required expenses and their effects upon Debt to Income Ratio: There is no homeowners insurance requirement, because the association dues pay for a master policy, but there is the additional expense of Association dues to charge against the borrower's monthly income. As far as Loan to Value Ratio goes, condominiums are precisely like single family residences, and you can find the same loans just as easily for them, at the same rate cost trade-offs, or very close. More and more, the fact that it's a condominium is becoming irrelevant to loan officers. Until Fannie and Freddie reinstated the requirement, most lenders had completely eliminated the "percentage of owner occupied units" guidelines that used to be such a bugbear for getting condominium loans approved. FHA had also always had the requirement for sixty percent owner occupancy to get loan approval. For these reasons, among others, condominium prices have taken off. In the last fifteen years, they have gone from being about half the price of a comparably sized and furnished detached home, to the point where they are basically proportional to detached single family homes, and in some areas, higher price per square foot due to the fact that they are a viable less expensive consumer's alternative due to (usually) fewer square feet to the dwelling, and so less expensive overall if not proportionately so.

(Fannie and Freddie reinstituted the requirement to make it look like they were doing something constructive in response to their bankruptcy. But truthfully, the only real effect it has is if the complex isn't fifty percent owner occupied now, it never will be because people who want to be owner occupants can't get loans because they don't have the down payment for other loan types, while landlord investors don't have any problems with the down payment requirements for portfolio lenders or commercial loans. Result: Fewer people can take the first step onto the property ladder. UPDATE: The owner occupancy requirement has now been reduced to thirty-five percent in most cases, which makes a real difference. If a condo complex dropped below sixty percent owner occupancy under the old rules, it was never going to be eligible again. Thirty-five percent is a realistic threshold to get back to)

The first real step away from the "stick built' house is the modular dwelling. These are piece-manufactured at factories, and assembled in pieces on site. Usually, it's something like one entire room-wall in a piece, with all the necessary plumbing and electrical already embedded in it, although sometimes it does take the form of entire rooms. Think of it like modular furniture, which is manufactured in individual pieces, but those pieces are intended to be put together so that instead of an arm chair and an ottoman, you have a chaise lounge. The important difference is that unlike modular furniture, once that modular house is assembled on that foundation, it's not going anywhere. Try to disconnect the plumbing hookups, or disassemble the pieces, and all you will likely have is much smaller pieces than you started with. Once assembled, modular housing isn't going anywhere. It is permanently attached to that land. For this reason, lenders are in the process of phasing out pricing discrimination against modular housing as opposed to stick built homes. For some lenders, modular gets the same exact loans as stick-built, for a few, there is a hit to the rate-cost trade-off that may be anywhere from a quarter of a point to a full point. Over half of the residential lenders in my database are happy to do residential real estate loans for modular housing on pretty much the same terms as stick-built. 100% percent financing (when that was available), interest only, even the horrible negative amortization loan were all available on modular homes. As a result, prices of modular homes may be a couple percent lower than those of stick built properties, but they are close comparable and the the investment potential is just as strong and there is no large amount of difficulty getting them sold due to the difficulty of getting a loan. Some lenders still don't want to touch them, but it's pretty easy to find lenders that will, and on the same terms as they do any other property, so the lenders who still will not lend on modular properties are hurting no one but themselves by dealing themselves out of possible business.

The next step away is manufactured housing on land owned by the home owner. Technically speaking, modular housing is a subset of manufactured housing, but when most lenders are talking about manufactured housing, they are talking about homes built at the factory in entire sections, and assembled with only a few total joins at the home site. True manufactured housing is portable, where modular really is not. If you're in Idaho and decide to move that house to your property in Georgia, it's doable.

Because it is portable, as you might guess from things I've said here about the prevalence of attempted scams that lenders have had issues with people dragging them off. You'd be right. Lenders file foreclosure papers on the land, and the homeowner metaphorically backs up the pick-up truck and takes that residence somewhere else, leaving the lenders with a piece of land and no residence. Because there is no longer a residence on it, it's not worth anything like what it was when there was a residence on it. Lenders have lost multiple hundreds of thousands of dollars on individual properties around here. You get burned enough times, you start getting wise. Those real estate lenders who will lend on manufactured homes require a laundry list of conditions, and even if they are all met, they won't loan 100 percent of the value, or anything like it, and there will be an additional charge of at least one full point of cost on their regular loan quotes. Cash out loans are typically limited to sixty-five percent of value, making it hard to tap equity. Furthermore, due to accounting standards and depreciation, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made a rule that manufactured homes were limited to twenty year loans, which drastically limits not only the type of loans available to their owners, but also has the effect of restricting what they can afford to borrow, because the payments principal has to be paid back over a shorter period, and the difference between a twenty and thirty year repayment is much greater than the difference between thirty and forty.

Because loans for manufactured homes are more expensive, harder to get, and amortized over a shorter period of time, this has the effect that even if someone wants to purchase a plot of land upon which the primary residence is a manufactured home, they cannot afford to pay as much for it. Let's say par rate on a thirty year fixed rate loan for a stick built house or condominium is 6.25%. To keep it simple, let's hypothesize that someone can afford loan payments of $2000 per month. That gives a loan amount of just under $325,000 for the stick built house ($324,824). Now because of the minimum one point hit, the equivalent rate on the manufactured home loan, even though it still sits upon owned land, is about 6.75%, and you're limited to a 20 year loan, giving a loan principal of about $263,000. The same person who can afford a stick built loan of $325,000 can only afford $263,000 for a manufactured home. This means that the manufactured home is not going to sell for as much money, because for what most people think of as the same price (monthly payment) they cannot afford as much manufactured home as stick built. This leaves completely aside such issues that magnify this difference as the fact that because the loan terms are more favorable, it's more cost effective to improve a stick-built home, so equivalent stick built homes have more amenities and are therefore even more attractive and more desirable. Not to mention the fact that the lender will require a minimum twenty percent down payment on the manufactured home, where they might not require more than 3.5 to 5 percent on the stick built. The people who are in the market for relatively inexpensive housing are first time buyers, and most first time buyers are trying anything they can to make the required down payment as small as possible. Very few of them have the larger down payments. This means that even if they are inclined to purchase a manufactured home, they are going to be constrained to purchase a stick built house by lending policy. That $263,000 loan I talked about earlier in the paragraph is only available if the buyer puts a down payment of $65,750 or more in addition to closing costs. For the vast majority of buyers, this limits their choice to stick-built, or none at all - If you only have $20,000 total, that's not going to stretch to the down payment on the manufactured home, where it will stretch for the 'stick built'. For these reasons, when people go to sell manufactured homes, one can expect the prices to be more than proportionately lower than those of comparable stick-built homes, and so investments in manufactured homes do not tend to pay off nearly so well as property earlier on this list. They are worth less than comparable "stick-built" properties because of lending policy,

There is one further step down on the list: Manufactured homes on rented land. These are not, properly speaking, real estate loans at all. There is no land involved. If there is no land involved, it's not real estate. Since there is no land involved, the loans are not real estate loans. They are listed in MLS because the people are buying and selling housing, but they are not real estate loans. It is very difficult finding lenders who will lend on them at all, and those few who will mostly do so through their automotive department (Credit unions are one good source for this kind of loan). Furthermore, whereas space rent might be cheap if it's your only cost of housing, it is expensive as compared to homeowners association dues, let alone property taxes, and the loans are still all twenty years or less. Because lenders don't like to touch them, because the down payment requirements are large, and because of the additional expenses imposed by space rent, prices for manufactured housing on rented land are microscopic by comparison with everything else. Even here in southern California, $100,000 buys a really nice 4 bedroom place where by comparison the lowest priced 4 bedroom anywhere in the county right now are $337,000 (manufactured on owned land, and way out in the hinterlands of east county).

Lest anyone think that this is in any way shape or form due to inferior construction, it is not. Because these buildings are manufactured on assembly lines which are largely robotic, there are many fewer problems with things like forgetting to nail at appropriate intervals, workers getting distracted, not getting corners square, and all those sorts of problems. I'd bet that a manufactured dwelling is probably of superior construction to a site built dwelling, all other things being equal. It is purely lender policy, as influenced by the history of their experiences with these kinds of properties, which is driving these differences.

So before you think a property is a great bargain, consider what kind of property it is, because even if you have plenty of income and a huge down payment and these concerns are irrelevant to you, when you go to sell it your prospective buyers will generally not have those things, and every time you eliminate a possible buyer from being able to consider a property, you statistically make the final sale price lower, and you statistically make the sales process take much longer. Eliminate enough potential buyers, and you're going to be very unhappy indeed.

Caveat Emptor

Original here

It has become a trend for real estate agents who think they're being "smart" to require an automated underwriting approval.

These are automated underwriting programs from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac saying that Fannie or Freddie will buy the loan providing that everything is precisely as represented. The advantage to automated underwriting is that it will often approve people who might not qualify under manual underwriting rules, but usually due to a particularly stirling credit score Fannie and Freddie will move someone who's marginal to an acceptance. The problem with automated underwriting is that absolutely nothing can change or it is no longer valid.

Let me tell you a true story that has happened to me twice now with different processors. In both cases, I ran automated underwriting on loan and got a full regular approval. Then my processor, for reasons known only to them that neither one of these two women were able to articulate to me, decided to run automated underwriting again on exactly the same refinance and gets a level 3. This is not a good thing. Level 3 acceptance is not the third level up the corporate food chain approving the loan. Think of it like life insurance, where level 3 means you're getting three bumps up the cost ladder because you're a riskier bet for the insurance company. That's what level 3 is. They'll still take you, but they want to charge extra. In each case, it could just as easily moved from "accept" all the way to "caution" (Freddie Mac's code word for "No, we won't buy it") What Level 3 meant in practical terms was that instead of making money on the loan, I lost money but completed the loan anyway because that's good business and the right thing to do for the client who trusted me. However, not every lender follows that business model.

If anything about the assumed scenario changes, automated underwriting that was previously done is useless. The two classics are if the purchase contract is for a little bit more or if the tradeoff in rate and cost gets a little higher rise a tad before they are locked. If the down payment is a couple hundred dollars less, or a slightly lower percentage of the purchase price. If one of the buyer's credit cards lowers the credit limit, resulting in a credit score a couple of points lower, that could trigger a change. The list of possible reasons for a change goes on and on.

There are exceptions and points in the process where as long as something is still within the same basic band of guidelines, you don't have to run automated underwriting again. For instance, if an appraisal for a refinance comes in slightly low but you're still within the same loan to value ratio band, I've funded loans without re-running automated underwriting.

The thing to take away from this is not to put your faith in automated underwriting from Fannie and Freddie. Above the cutoffs for manual underwriting, it is extremely finicky. It can be finicky even below those guidelines, as one of the above mentioned processors found out. Truthfully, if lenders didn't give price breaks for automated underwriting, I wouldn't do it except in those circumstances where the buyer doesn't qualify under manual underwriting rules.

In fact, the real Gold Standard for preliminary approval is manual underwriting. Going through manual underwriting isn't sexy, and it doesn't generate a result that looks like it was Handed Down From On High. "Hey, I put this information into the computer and it said I was approved!" as voices from heaven sing "Hallelujah!" (at least in the mind of that deluded individual). But if a borrower qualifies under manual underwriting rules, then they qualify. Maybe that lender won't give their loan officer that quarter of a discount point for automated underwriting, but they will fund the loan provided everything checks out and there aren't any loanbusters. Somebody will approve it and it will fund.

If there are loanbusters present, automated underwriting won't catch that any better than manual. As a matter of fact, manual underwriting is better at catching loanbusters before it gets that far. If the buyer's ratios are tight and qualification depends upon rates that might not be there tomorrow at a cost they can afford to pay, that shows up quite well under manual underwriting. As a listing agent, if I see someone with a 44.9% debt to income ratio and just barely enough cash to close under the listed assumptions, I know that's a shaky deal at best. Automated underwriting doesn't tell you how close to the line it is, it just tells you the result. Manual underwriting lets you know how resilient the buyer's ability to carry through on the purchase is likely to be if something goes a little bit differently that projected. I don't know about you, but in my experience, transactions where everything goes precisely according to the initial plan are about as common as battle plans that survive contact with the enemy.

(Note however, that the originator of that quote strongly believed in planning the whole campaign out in an extensive and detailed manner beforehand so that when issues happened, he and his officers knew what their options were and were not. As a result, he was the most successful general of his day even if most Americans have never heard of him. While Lee and Grant were mucking about mostly over a small patch of Virginia for years, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder planned and executed two successful winning wars in a single campaign each)

As a listing agent, I will not accept automated underwriting results attesting to the buyer's qualification. I want to know how subject to failure this offer is. As a buyer's agent, I don't write them unless clueless listing agents demand them. The object, after all, is to get the property for the buyer at a price they are willing to pay, and beating the listing agent up on this subject is counterproductive to that, no matter how stupid it on their part. If you're a seller and want to know how qualified a buyer really is, insist upon seeing the manual underwriting numbers.

Caveat Emptor

Original article here