Mortgages: August 2009 Archives

The main body of this article is a reprint from December 2007. I will add some comments as to how this has shaken out thus far.

I was thinking we were ready for a recovery here in San Diego, but if these go through unamended, that will not be the case. Just in time to be the Grinch that Stole Christmas, the Federal Reserve has decided to perform a gigantic belly-flop into a situation that was already being dealt with, and make it worse.

From the AP story:

Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and contender for his party's presidential nomination, called the Fed proposal a "significant step backwards." Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., said it shows that the Fed is "not a strong advocate for consumers, and two, there is no Santa Claus. People who are surprised by the one are presumably surprised by the other."

And these are the Democrats, who never met a government regulation they didn't like as well as Chris Dodd and Barney Frank being firmly in the pocket of the lending industry.

Alright, enough hyping it up and let's get to what's available, which isn't much yet.

Here's the Press Release, and from the Federal Reserve website, here is the summarized version (actual text not available either in Federal Register or on Federal Reserve website yet)

The proposal would establish a new category of "higher-priced mortgages" that should include virtually all subprime loans.1 The proposal would, for these loans:

* Prohibit a lender from engaging in a pattern or practice of lending without considering borrowers' ability to repay the loans from sources other than the home's value.

* Prohibit a lender from making a loan by relying on income or assets that it does not verify.

* Restrict prepayment penalties only to loans that meet certain conditions, including the condition that the penalty expire at least sixty days before any possible payment increase.

* Require that the lender establish an escrow account for the payment of property taxes and homeowners' insurance. The lender may only offer the borrower the opportunity to opt out of the escrow account after one year.

The proposal would, for these and most other mortgages:

* Prohibit lenders from paying mortgage brokers "yield spread premiums" that exceed the amount the consumer had agreed in advance the broker would receive. A yield spread premium is the fee paid by a lender to a broker for higher-rate loans.

* Prohibit certain servicing practices, such as failing to credit a payment to a consumer's account when the servicer receives it, failing to provide a payoff statement within a reasonable period of time, and "pyramiding" late fees.

* Prohibit a creditor or broker from coercing or encouraging an appraiser to misrepresent the value of a home.

* Prohibit seven misleading or deceptive advertising practices for closed-end loans; for example, using the term "fixed" to describe a rate that is not truly fixed. It would also require that all applicable rates or payments be disclosed in advertisements with equal prominence as advertised introductory or "teaser" rates.

* Require truth-in-lending disclosures to borrowers early enough to use while shopping for a mortgage. Lenders could not charge fees until after the consumer receives the disclosures, except a fee to obtain a credit report.

Let's take these bullet point by bullet point, and consider their effects upon consumers and the marketplace. Actually, let's take the first two together:

Prohibit a lender from engaging in a pattern or practice of lending without considering borrowers' ability to repay the loans from sources other than the home's value.

Prohibit a lender from making a loan by relying on income or assets that it does not verify.

Goodbye, not only Stated Income loans, but NINA loans (aka "no ratio") as well.

I'm not going to pretend stated income hasn't been abused, seeing as how I've been one of the loudest voices condemning it for the past several years. Both Stated Income and NINA nonetheless have their uses, and do help significant and increasing segments of the population. Indeed, they are necessary for increasing segments of the population. Here's why: When documenting income, there are only three acceptable ways to do it. A paper is limited to income reported on the Adjusted Gross Income line of form 1040 (or the equivalent line of forms 1040A and 1040EZ), or for certain salaried employees, W-2 forms. To this, subprime adds the ability to document income via bank statements, but they don't give credit for 100% of income, and it's only net income that finds its way onto bank statements. This makes bank statements a bad way to try and qualify for a loan, because there are a lot of situations and loans where a consumer could qualify by real income, they cannot qualify based upon bank statements. Qualification by bank statements is also subject to a lot of abuse and manipulation, so I don't like to do it as it can leave me vulnerable to a scam artist.

But if you make commission or are in construction or are a contract employee or aren't an employee at all (i.e. self-employed), all of which are large and growing fractions of the population, the only acceptable way to document income is with a 1040. But if you look at form 1040, there's a whole lot of stuff that gets deducted from income prior to this determination, not to mention a lot of other expenses are deducted on Schedule C (among others) and never show up on the main 1040 at all. Upshot: People who have to qualify via form 1040 are penalized in their ability to qualify for loans. It is very common for self-employed people to be making the money to afford the loan, but to be unable to document it. This rule would prevent those people from obtaining that loan. I have seen circumstances where the secretary could document more income than the owner of the business - and it wasn't that he was hurting or that it was a new business - it was a going concern and he was donating more than the secretary's base salary to charity every year.

Similarly, the allowance for income from investments in entirely nonsense: three percent per year. For crying out loud, savings bonds pay more than that. If I have a million dollars in investments, my income had darned well better be above $30,000. What's going on is that this is a safe harbor allowance because the investment markets are unpredictable, but it's not a realistic estimate.

Finally: What about the people who got into their current homes and current loans through stated income? How in the nine billion names of god are they supposed to refinance out of their current nightmares if nobody can do stated income or NINA loans for them? This starts the tidal wave of foreclosures we just averted all over again. I realize that it's theoretically for sub-prime loans only, but expect this proposal to have a major negative impact on every local market, if enacted.

AT THE UPDATE: This prediction of mine has been 100% borne out. Right now, about the only people who are still in trouble are those who need stated income loans, which haven't quite been actually prohibited by the actual regulations passed - but nobody is doing them any longer. The last lender I'm aware of that would consider stated income loans at all stopped taking applications in June 2009 - not that they were helping many people. When you buy for twenty percent or less down, as most stated income programs were doing, and values recede by 30-40%, you're upside down and have major difficulty refinancing, if you can refinance at all. Unless there's a special program to refinance upside down homeowners for which you are eligible, the only hope you have is mortgage loan modification from your current lender.

Next up:

Restrict prepayment penalties only to loans that meet certain conditions, including the condition that the penalty expire at least sixty days before any possible payment increase.

I can get behind this. In fact, I've been begging for a mostly stronger version of this for years - that no prepayment penalty can last longer than the period of fixed interest rate. Focus on the real cost of money, dadgum it! (The way the Fed puts this merely emphasizes once again that they are bankers rather than economists or financial planners). It's possible for a loan like a thirty year fixed with an initial interest only rider to increase the payment without changing the fact that it's the same rate but that's a comparatively rare thing. How about combining the two restrictions? Negative Amortization loans have a low fixed payment, but the interest rate is variable from day one. But if the Fed won't take my suggestion, I'll take what I can get.

Require that the lender establish an escrow account for the payment of property taxes and homeowners' insurance. The lender may only offer the borrower the opportunity to opt out of the escrow account after one year.

And the Fed is back to putting their foot in their mouth (after stepping in dog doo). There have been so many impound account problems over the years that many states (California among them) have dealt with the issue and actually prohibited lenders from requiring an impound account, or even from pricing the loan differently if the consumer doesn't want one. Lest there be any doubt, this is one of the few things that the state legislature of California has done right in the last thirty years. This proposed regulation is incompatible with California state law as it exists. Upshot: I'm not a lawyer, so I'm not certain. It could be that there's no more new loans in California until the discrepancy is resolved. This is a regulation to protect bankers from themselves and from the saner moments of various state legislatures. It also raises the opportunity cost of refinancing, because as I explained in my article on Impound Accounts, the consumer has to either roll this money into the balance of their new loan (where they'll pay interest on it for as long as they have a loan) or come up with thousands of additional dollars in cash until they get the check from their old impound account. Like I've said many times, the Fed is composed of bankers, and makes its decisions for the benefit of bankers, not consumers. This proposal serves nobody but bankers.

AT THE UPDATE: Luckily, this didn't actually get enacted, because if these people don't have the cash in their checking accounts to seed a new impound account (which they don't) and don't have equity in their homes to borrow against for the seed money, such a loan wouldn't happen. We're already seeing enough nonsense in this paranoid lending environment.

Prohibit lenders from paying mortgage brokers "yield spread premiums" that exceed the amount the consumer had agreed in advance the broker would receive. A yield spread premium is the fee paid by a lender to a broker for higher-rate loans.

This I can live with. Not that it's not subject to manipulation, but I can live with it. As I've said when I explained Yield Spread, I just plan to make my money on origination and rebate the money for the yield spread to the consumer. Alternatively, I can "pad" what I actually expect to make by a little bit when I have the consumer sign off on the yield spread. Tell them I'm going to make a full point when I'm actually looking to make eight tenths, or three quarters when it's really a half. Of course, this is bankers trying to make brokers appear less competitive by distracting consumers from the net terms to them, because if I deliver the loan I originally said I would, it makes no difference to the consumer if I make two dollars or two million via yield spread. If my loan wasn't the best they were offered, they'd have gone with someone else. One small side benefit is that it might keep some idiots from floating the rate while telling the consumer it was locked.

AT THE UPDATE: This proposal hasn't actually been enacted yet, but Congress is on the verge of doing so in a manner that basically prohibits brokers from doing what I proposed above. I'm more of a correspondent, so this doesn't hurt me directly as the money my company gets from the secondary market when selling the loan isn't covered by the legislation - like I said, Congress is in the pocket of bankers and is doing everything possible to protect bankers and disadvantage brokers, who provide cheaper better loans to the public. The secondary market premium obtained by bankers isn't covered - it's just that they're prohibited from passing part of it on to brokers in the form of yield spread. What this means is that Congress is helping the lenders get together and enforce and agreement not to offer yield spread. Offering yield spread means individual lenders get more business by competing for broker generated business, but it hurts the profit margins of the lending industry overall. Yield spread also benefits consumers, as low cost loans cannot be done without it. Finally, it means that for low dollar amount loans, no yield spread means that the consumer looking for a mortgage under $100,000 basically has two choices: A direct lender or no loan at all. Whereas this legislation would help my business by lessening competition, I am adamantly opposed to it on the grounds of consumer benefit. I have written all three of my (Democratic) representatives in Congress. Senator Boxer and Representative Filner did not see fit to respond at all. Senator Feinstein responded with a letter I probably should have printed before destroying it because she proved once again she (or her staff) are completely clueless bozos when it comes to anything relating to the economy.

Two more at once:

Prohibit certain servicing practices, such as failing to credit a payment to a consumer's account when the servicer receives it, failing to provide a payoff statement within a reasonable period of time, and "pyramiding" late fees.

* Prohibit a creditor or broker from coercing or encouraging an appraiser to misrepresent the value of a home.

I find it mind-boggling that these are not already prohibited by the Federal Reserve. I thought they were. Rock. Gravity. Use your imagination. Of course, this will have no impact upon state chartered institutions, but California must have dealt with this one a long time ago.

Prohibit seven misleading or deceptive advertising practices for closed-end loans; for example, using the term "fixed" to describe a rate that is not truly fixed. It would also require that all applicable rates or payments be disclosed in advertisements with equal prominence as advertised introductory or "teaser" rates.

I find it mind boggling that this wasn't done years ago. I've written about this many times. Must be all those congressional campaign contributions the lenders make. Once again, however, absolutely no effect upon state-chartered lending institutions.

Require truth-in-lending disclosures to borrowers early enough to use while shopping for a mortgage. Lenders could not charge fees until after the consumer receives the disclosures, except a fee to obtain a credit report.

Second part first, about not charging fees until after consumer receives disclosures: This is actually good. However, it's not a common problem, and it doesn't prohibit deposits, which a lender can then keep after they fork over the disclosures. Deposits are not fees. Once an unscrupulous lender has the money, good luck getting it back. This is why the more ethical loan providers are strictly "fees at time of service." You pay for the credit report when it is pulled. You pay for the appraisal when the appraiser does the work. You pay for the survey (in those states where it's required) when the surveyor does the work. But if the lender has your money, they can hold it hostage, even if it's not technically theirs yet. Practical effect in limiting unscrupulous practices: zero. In fact, it provides the unscrupulous with a bit of ready made misdirection. "It's just a deposit - we can't charge any fees until we give the disclosures" then immediately charge the fees out of the deposit even though the disclosures are pure nonsense.

Which is another problem. As I have gone over ad nauseum, none of the initial disclosures is in any way binding. Here is a very partial list of how lenders legally lowball each and every one of the initial disclosure forms. Truth-In-Lending, in particular, is based upon figures in the Good Faith Estimate or California MLDS, which are thus subject to low-balling. As any high school student who's ever messed up their chemistry or physics experiment can tell you, if you are basing your calculations upon bad measurements, the answer is going to be wrong. Logically, faulty premises produce a faulty conclusion. Or to quote the old programmer's maxim: Garbage In, Garbage Out. It doesn't matter how you get there. The mathematical calculations used to generate the Truth In Lending form require that the numbers used to generate the base document be complete and accurate. Since that is not the case, Truth in Lending is a joke, and for most practical purposes, you should ignore APR.

AT THE UPDATE: The law actually passed to update RESPA in this manner constitute nothing more than yet another giant belly flop on behalf of Congress. Unscrupulous mortgage providers - broker or direct lender - can still lie like a rug to get you to sign up for their loan. Then seven days before the end of a thirty day process, when nobody else can likely get the loan done on time, they have to tell you the truth - and they can bury it in the middle of a pile of other paperwork, where if the consumer doesn't realize how important it is, they'll just gloss right over it. Basically, all these regulations have done is add about two weeks to the entire process of getting a loan - not beneficial to consumers. Very not beneficial to consumers. I'd say something a lot stronger, but I am trying to keep this PG rated.

All in all, this looks somewhat like hearing Mighty Mouse's famous, "Here I come to save the Day!", only to look around and see Tennessee Tuxedo (If you're not familiar, the fact that he was voiced by Don Adams of Get Smart fame should tell you all you need to know, but the cartoon penguin was even more of a bungler). The good stuff should have been taken care of decades ago, the rest is more menace than anything else. "The Federal Reserve will not fail!" If only! I'm starting to think that Peter Sellers is not dead, only in hiding, secretly running the Federal Reserve as Inspector Closeau. It would explain a lot.

Caveat Emptor

AT THE UPDATE: If anyone is wondering why I am not railing against Home Valuation Code of Conduct in this article, that actually is the result of a lawsuit by Andrew Cuomo, Attorney General of New York. How the Attorney General of one state has managed to dictate lending policy in all fifty states and secure personal control over the mortgage market from the entire country (as well as what is essentially taxpayer financed government patronage jobs and monetary tribute from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are now essentially government owned) is a modern day tragedy - it happened because too few people cared enough to stop it. The fact that he used public resources (State of New York taxpayer dollars) to fund a lawsuit that resulted in a personal political windfall is only icing upon the cake. The fact that our legacy media (TV, newspapers, radio and magazines) aren't trumpeting it to the skies and looking for the political hide of anyone involved to nail to their walls should be proof that they are in no way, shape or form public servants and have failed miserably and pathetically in that role. HVCC cannot be blamed upon Congress or the Fed, and I cannot hold the Fed accountable for it as they have no authority to override the results of legal action. I can only hold Congress accountable to the degree of failing to fix the problem - and truly, what is the likelihood of a Democratic Congress acting to remove such a windfall on the part of a Democratic politician?

Original article here

It has become a trend for real estate agents who think they're being "smart" to require an automated underwriting approval.

These are automated underwriting programs from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac saying that Fannie or Freddie will buy the loan providing that everything is precisely as represented. The advantage to automated underwriting is that it will often approve people who might not qualify under manual underwriting rules, but usually due to a particularly stirling credit score Fannie and Freddie will move someone who's marginal to an acceptance. The problem with automated underwriting is that absolutely nothing can change or it is no longer valid.

Let me tell you a true story that has happened to me twice now with different processors. In both cases, I ran automated underwriting on loan and got a full regular approval. Then my processor, for reasons known only to them that neither one of these two women were able to articulate to me, decides to run automated underwriting again on exactly the same refinance and gets a level 3. This is not a good thing. Level 3 acceptance is not the third level up the corporate food chain approving the loan. Think of it like life insurance, where level 3 means you're getting three bumps up the cost ladder because you're a riskier bet for the insurance company. That's what level 3 is. They'll still take you, but they want to charge extra. In each case, it could just as easily moved from "accept" all the way to "caution" (Freddie Mac's code word for "No, we won't buy it") What Level 3 meant in practical terms was that instead of making money on the loan, I lost money but completed the loan anyway because that's good business and the right thing to do for the client who trusted me. However, not every lender follows that business model.

If anything about the assumed scenario changes, automated underwriting that was previously done is useless. The two classics are if the purchase contract is for a little bit more or if the tradeoff in rate and cost gets a little higher rise a tad before they are locked. If the down payment is a couple hundred dollars less, or a slightly lower percentage of the purchase price. If one of the buyer's credit cards lowers the credit limit, resulting in a credit score a couple of points lower.

There are exceptions and points in the process where as long as something is still within the same basic band of guidelines, you don't have to run automated underwriting again. For instance, if an appraisal for a refinance comes in slightly low but you're still within the same loan to value ratio band, I've funded loans without re-running automated underwriting.

The thing to take away from this is not to put your faith in automated underwriting from Fannie and Freddie. Above the cutoffs for manual underwriting, it is extremely finicky. It can be finicky even below those guidelines, as one of the above mentioned processors found out. Truthfully, if lenders didn't give price breaks for automated underwriting, I wouldn't do it except in those circumstances where the buyer doesn't qualify under manual underwriting rules.

In fact, the real Gold Standard for preliminary approval is manual underwriting. Going through manual underwriting isn't sexy, and it doesn't generate a result that looks like it was Handed Down From On High. "Hey, I put this information into the computer and it said I was approved!" as voices from heaven sing "Hallelujah!" (at least in the mind of that deluded individual). But if a borrower qualifies under manual underwriting rules, then they qualify. Maybe that lender won't give their loan officer that quarter of a discount point for automated underwriting, but they will fund the loan provided everything checks out and there aren't any loanbusters. Somebody will approve it and it will fund.

If there are loanbusters present, automated underwriting won't catch that any better than manual. As a matter of fact, manual underwriting is better at catching loanbusters before it gets that far. If the buyer's ratios are tight and qualification depends upon rates that might not be there tomorrow at a cost they can afford to pay, that shows up quite well under manual underwriting. As a listing agent, if I see someone with a 44.9% debt to income ratio and just barely enough cash to close under the listed assumptions, I know that's a shaky deal at best. Automated underwriting doesn't tell you how close to the line it is, it just tells you the result. Manual underwriting lets you know how resilient the buyer's ability to carry through on the purchase is likely to be if something goes a little bit differently that projected. I don't know about you, but in my experience, transactions where everything goes precisely according to the initial plan are about as common as battle plans that survive contact with the enemy.

(Note however, that the originator of that quote strongly believed in planning the whole campaign out in an extensive and detailed manner beforehand so that when issues happened, he and his officers knew what their options were and were not. As a result, he was the most successful general of his day even if most Americans have never heard of him. While Lee and Grant were mucking about mostly over a small patch of Virginia for years, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder planned and executed two successful winning wars in a single campaign each)

As a listing agent, I will not accept automated underwriting results attesting to the buyer's qualification. I want to know how subject to failure this offer is. As a buyer's agent, I don't write them unless clueless listing agents demand them. The object, after all, is to get the property for the buyer at a price they are willing to pay, and beating the listing agent up on this subject is counterproductive to that, no matter how stupid it is. If you're a seller and want to know how qualified a buyer really is, insist upon seeing the manual underwriting numbers.

Caveat Emptor

Article UPDATED here